02 April 2013

Anne Sibert: Deposit insurance after Iceland and Cyprus

The facts are now well known. The largest banks in Cyprus are insolvent, but too big for the government of Cyprus to save – at least if it wanted to avoid the ‘double drowning’ fate of Ireland. The government, trying to rescue banks, found itself needing a rescue...

Even though it wasn’t adopted, the extraordinary proposal that small depositors should lose a part of their savings – a proposal that had the approval of the Eurogroup, ECB and IMF policymakers – raises the question:

• Is there any credible protection for small-bank depositors in Europe? And if the answer is no, should there be? Members of the European Economic Area – this covers the EU plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland – are required to set up deposit-insurance schemes that cover most depositors up to €100,000. The Directive allows Member States to choose among different types of schemes, and the idea is that they will be funded by taxing resident banks.
• The intent of the legislation appears to be to ensure schemes funded by credit institutions are in place to protect small depositors in the event of the failure of a small or medium-sized bank.
• The question of how depositors are to be compensated if such a scheme is set up and the scale of a banking crisis is such that the scheme lacks the necessary funds is left unanswered. Either the Directive is not meant to cover such a scenario or it is a classic example of mandating without funding.

The Iceland precedent

Cyprus is not the first time deposits security came into doubt. When the Icelandic bank Icesave went down, the relevant court ruled that the Icelandic government was not legally obligated to repay UK and Dutch depositors in a timely fashion (EFTA Court 2013). Here is the key:

• The court accepted Iceland’s argument that the EU Directive was never meant to deal with the collapse of an entire banking system. It noted that the provision of a scheme that was both financed solely by credit institutions and that was able to guarantee coverage in the case of a systemic collapse would itself undermine the stability of the financial system (para 158) and that the provision of a scheme backed by a legal obligation of the state would have a negative effect on competition (para 164).

Lessons: Deposit insurance as a political vs legal commitment

The Cyprus and Iceland lesson is clear:

• Deposit insurance is only insurance for small crises.
• Sufficiently large bank failures or system collapses are a different matter. In such cases, small depositors are only safe if the sovereign has both the ability and willingness to compensate them.

Consider the ex-ante ability of Cyprus and Iceland to assure their bank deposit:

• In 2011, assets of commercial banks in Cyprus with Cypriot parents were about five times Cyprus’s GDP.
• Including subsidiaries of foreign banks domiciled in Cyprus (and covered by Cyprus’s deposit insurance) the ratio is about seven (IMF 2011).
• In Iceland, the assets of the three large Icelandic banks were about 11 times as large as Icelandic GDP prior to their collapse.

Looking at this, and noting the precedents set in Iceland, it seems clear that these deposits were not insured for the case of systemic failure...

Avoiding bank runs

A third argument that is sometimes made is that deposit insurance prevents contagion. That is, if depositors at failed banks are forced to take losses then there may be runs on solvent banks as well. The idea is that if each depositor believes that all other depositors will run and as a consequence an otherwise solvent bank will fail, then it is optimal for each depositor to run as well. As a result the bank fails. Observing depositors lose their money at a failed bank is the sort of event that might coordinate the beliefs of depositors of solvent banks in such a fashion.

But the argument misses an important point. There are other ways to prevent self-fulfilling bank runs. Runs on solvent banks can be prevented or their effects mitigated by having a central bank such as the Eurosystem that is a credible lender of last resort. This argument alone provides no need for transfers from either taxpayers or other credit institutions to any of the creditors of a failed bank.

Conclusion

If the EEA wants to provide credible deposit-insurance schemes that cover the collapse of large banks or (not too large) banking systems, then it needs schemes that are jointly and severally funded. However, it is unreasonable to expect the area as a whole to bail out a particular country’s banks unless it can also supervise that country’s banks. This is problematic for the EEA or even the EU, but it may be possible – at least in the eurozone – when and if the single supervisory mechanism comes into being.

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