21 January 2013

Bundesbank/Weidmann: Pressing ahead - Priorities for 2013.

Regulation

On the question of regulation, I would like to highlight three areas as examples of where we now need to move forward. First, the new Basel III capital requirements. These should now be transposed into national law worldwide, including in the United States.

Second, in Germany as elsewhere, we need to make further improvements to the arrangements for shielding deposit-taking credit institutions from the risks of speculative proprietary trading and high-risk lending. This involves more than just tighter capital rules. A requirement to establish trading units which are legally, organisationally and economically independent can help protect deposit-takers, while at the same time allowing the advantages of Germany’s universal banking system to be retained. Indeed, there is no call to forfeit these advantages, since banking systems with fully segregated functions did not prove to be in any way superior in the financial crisis...

A third area where progress needs to be made on the regulatory front is high-frequency trading. The Bundesbank expressly welcomes the objectives of the relevant draft legislation. Computer-based high-frequency trading can enhance the efficiency of financial markets, for example by increasing market liquidity. Equally, though, high-frequency trading is susceptible to error and brings certain dangers with it.

The plans to improve transparency through expanded information require-ments are therefore appropriate. The installation of a “kill switch” would be advisable, to enable erroneous or market-damaging algorithms to be deactivated...

Framework of monetary union and banking union

Nor has the journey’s end been reached with regard to a new, consistent framework for European monetary union. Moreover, so far there is still no consensus on what the final destination should be...

The creation of a banking union is a case of major institutional work in progress and is, in essence, a matter of much the same complexity as setting up a monetary union. And even if it will certainly take less than the whole decade needed for EMU, it is a project that must not be rushed. It is too important for that. Nor should it create any new conflicts of interest which divert monetary policy from its primary objective of safeguarding price stability. Nevertheless, the easing in the financial markets must not dampen the zeal for reform in this area. Our guiding principle should be to act “as quickly as due caution allows”.

A banking union entails not only a joint supervisory mechanism operating in accordance with the strictest uniform rules and standards possible. A resolution and restructuring mechanism, too, has to be an integral part of a banking union. A few days ago, Commission President Barroso rightly described this intention as a matter of the highest priority. Such a mechanism should ensure that, in the event of a bank encountering difficulties, it is, first and foremost, the owners and creditors who are liable for their investment decisions, followed by a fund supported by the banks, and only then – in exceptional cases – the taxpayer, with mutualised liability being possible only in the case of jointly supervised institutions...

Central bank independence at risk

Transferring responsibility for banking supervision to the ECB nevertheless fits in well with an impression that is becoming increasingly difficult to shake off outside the euro area as well. Central banks are having more and more responsibility thrust on them, even for tasks which lie outside their core mandate...

Stephen King, chief economist at HSBC, is perhaps right in predicting that: “The era of independent central banks is coming to an end". Even now, some worrying encroachments can be observed, say, in Hungary or in Japan, where the new government is involving itself massively in the affairs of the central bank, making forceful calls for an (even more) aggressive monetary policy and threatening an end to central bank autonomy.

One consequence, whether intentional or not, might also be an increasing politicisation of the exchange rate. So far, the international monetary system has come through the crisis without competitive devaluations and I hope very much that things stay like that...

Since the outbreak of the crisis, the environment has become noticeably less favourable for central bankers. The growing demand for energy and raw materials on the part of the up-and-coming economies has tended to make the inflation-dampening impact of globalisation flip over into rising pressure on prices.

In the wake of the financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis, central banks are being urged to take measures to support the financial system, stimulate economic activity, reduce government funding costs and even safeguard government solvency. Overburdening central banks with tasks and expectations, however, is certainly not the right way to achieve a lasting solution to the crisis. The central banks, in turn, will best protect their independence by adopting a narrow interpretation of their mandate...

What matters now

The key to resolving the crisis therefore does not lie with the central banks. Rather, permanently overcoming the crisis will now be a matter of rapidly implementing the regulatory reforms that have already been agreed in principle – above all Basel III – and governments implementing budget consolidation and the necessary structural reforms in a controlled, creative but consistent manner – and not just in Europe. Similarly, it will be important to put in place a coherent framework for the monetary union – a framework in which, despite the communitisation of risks, liability and control are not thrown out of kilter –with everything based on the Maastricht principles as long as there are no majorities for a genuine fiscal union. In this connection, too, the banking union should be designed in such a way that it really does become a primary pillar of a stability union.

Full speech

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