Fondation Robert Schuman: A change of era (Zeitenwende) in Germany and its implications for European integration

03 October 2022

The Russian aggression in Ukraine, on-going since 24 February 2022, has shattered the European collective security system that was patiently built up in the 1970s and which has been consolidated since the end of the Cold War.

For Germany, the return of war to European soil, a few hundred kilometres from its territory, is a stinging rejection of the policy of normalisation and openness towards the East (Ostpolitik) supported by Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974) and to which the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the left-wing party (die Linke) had until then been very attached.

The pacifism that permeates German society and the resulting restraint in foreign policy, a sign of German contrition for the horrors of the Second World War, are also being questioned: they could potentially lead to a 'soft' response to the aggression against Ukraine, which might then encourage further Russian attacks on Western European security. This aggression also challenges the concept of the "Exportnation" - the exporting nation - dear to the Christian Democrats (CDU), who gambled that trade and the interdependencies it entails would guarantee peace with Russia. Instrumentalised as a weapon of war, Germany's cheap energy supplies from its Russian neighbour, which had never been at issue - even in the worst hours of the Cold War - have become a major source of vulnerability for German economic growth.

While it was already experiencing tensions before the Russian aggression, the German foreign policy model has now entered into a period of accelerated change and new directions are taking shape, in the course of the speeches made by its Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Annalena Baerbock and Christine Lambrecht. They confirm or deny the trajectory defined in the 'Ampel' coalition contract between the SPD, the Greens and the Liberals (FDP). The answer is threefold: at national level, certain decisions taken in response to the Russian invasion could change Germany's international and European positioning; initially, the war in Ukraine created a German-American "transatlantic moment", but it also has opened up strong prospects for a revival of European integration, in which Germany intends to play a leading role; for a long time an economic giant but a political dwarf, Germany seems to be abandoning the posture of restraint that characterised its foreign policy, deciding to fully deploy all the facets of its power on the European and international stage. This is both a challenge and an opportunity for the Franco-German couple in the construction of Europe.

I. Disenchantment with Russia and initial national responses



A break in relations with Russia



Due to the complex, historically rooted relationship between Germany and Russia, the former has a large community (2.7 million people in 2017) of "Russlanddeutsche", former German minorities who emigrated to Russia in the time of Catherine II and who returned to Germany after 1990. If we add the Russian speakers in Germany, there are about five million people living in the eastern Länder in particular, who are not always well integrated socially and who continued to consult the Russian media prior to the conflict.

The political parties' programmes before the 2021 elections all advocated a continued cooperative relationship with Russia, as part of a renewed Ostpolitik at European level for the SPD, and in important areas such as the fight against climate change and energy. Die Linke, which was formed in 2007 from a merger between the former GDR communist party (SED) and the West German radical left, and the far right (AfD) refused to consider Russia as an enemy and even suggested the establishment of a collective security system including Russia. The CDU-CSU and SPD were in favour of maintaining sanctions against Russia because of its policy in Ukraine, its disinformation campaigns, its cyber-attacks, and its support for dictatorial regimes (Belarus, Syria), but they supported the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. The Greens and the FDP were the most cautious towards Russia: critical of the pipeline project, they supported, if necessary, the prospect of stronger sanctions against Russia. All hoped for progress in the implementation of the 2014 Minsk Agreements between Ukraine and Russia, and all wanted to believe in the increased effectiveness of the "Normandy Format" of Franco-German mediation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

The 'Ampel' coalition agreement between the SPD, Greens and FDP emphasised the 'deep and multifaceted relationship' between Germany and Russia. Given the threatening perception held by Central and Eastern European neighbours and criticising the infringement of civil liberties and democracy in Russia, it nevertheless called for "constructive dialogue (...), based on respect for international law, human rights and the European order". The coalition wanted to cooperate with Russia on future issues such as hydrogen, health, climate, and the environment. It also planned to liberalise visas, especially for young people, and to support international negotiations for nuclear control and eventually disarmament.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine upset these positions, and the entire German political class had to review its policy towards Russia: in early April, the President of the Republic, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD), admitted: "We have failed in our project to build a common European home (...) "We continued to believe in bridges in which Russia no longer believed, about which our partners had warned us." Friedrich Merz, leader of the CDU, also acknowledged "serious shortcomings", including within the CDU, in Germany's policy towards Russia over the past twenty years. Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), deemed at the end of August that "there will be no turning back, the harsh reality being that Russia will remain a threat to peace and security". The AfD and die Linke, which are in the minority, remain generally pro-Russian but are divided on the issue. As for former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD), his claim to be playing the role of mediator between Ukraine and Russia has been discredited by the many mandates he holds in Russian energy groups and by his proximity to Vladimir Putin....

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