Policy Exchange: Getting Over the Line: Solutions to the Irish border

09 May 2018

Policy Exchange’s Chief Economic Adviser, Dr Graham Gudgin and former Irish diplomat Ray Bassett call for the so-called ‘Max Fac option’ to be pursued by the UK Government.

The main argument of the report is that an Irish border without physical infrastructure is fully attainable, and therefore that the overly complex proposals for a Customs Partnership are unnecessary. Arrangements based on the UK’s proposals for an expanded trusted trader scheme and exemptions for small traders will suffice to operate a border without infrastructure. The additional idea of a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around the whole island for animal health may have additional merit as long as it carries no constitutional implications that unionists would reject. All of this would be greatly facilitated by the Free Trade Agreement that the UK wishes to negotiate and which the EU is delaying and frustrating.

Modern technology means that physical customs posts, or even cameras, are no longer essential at borders. This has been pointed out by Lars Karlsson, a customs expert commissioned by the EU to look into this subject, who envisages the use of mobile phone and GPS technology to track HGVs, together with the computer-based customs clearing (the norm across much of the world). Computerised customs clearing consists of declarations of tariff duties payable, including on import content, and also the necessary certification of regulatory approval. Inspection of animal health and food standards can occur at producers’ premises, is common in current practice. Customs clearance occurs at the exporter’s premises and the sealed consignments can then cross the Irish border while being tracked electronically by customs authorities. Few additional incentives for smuggling will be in place if there is an FTA, but smuggling can be further deterred if legislation mandates that all HGVs operating in Ireland carry tracking technology.

Supporters of UK membership of the EU Customs Union assert that no border exists anywhere in the world without some physical infrastructure. This is true in principle but not relevant to the case in hand. Mr Karlsson says that arrangements without physical infrastructure have been successfully trialled on the Norway-Sweden border. The only reason that they have not been adopted for general use on this border is that the existing border arrangements are satisfactory and hence the cost of new electronic systems is not justified.

Our conclusion is that the UK can deliver the promise of “no hard border” in Ireland without remaining in the EU Customs Union, or inventing new and complex schemes involving the tracking of individual consignments to their final destination. Since very few consignments are actually checked at existing EU borders, and those checks are usually based on intelligence received, such checks can easily be made away from borders.

Nor do we believe that the Good Friday Agreement is particularly affected by Brexit. The reason for avoiding a hard border is rather to avoid endangering officials charged with erecting, maintaining or operating border infrastructure. If anything, the danger of dissident paramilitaries attacking infrastructure or the associated officials has been heightened by the over-reaction of opponents of Brexit but precautions are now necessary.

The Irish Government is playing a calculated but risky game by demanding that Northern Ireland remains within the EU Customs Union and by threatening to use its veto in the negotiations. Ireland more than any EU economy needs free trade with the UK but has made no efforts to promote such an agreement in Brussels. Indeed, its main effort has been to frustrate moves in this direction.

The priority now should be for the British and Irish sides to return to the cooperative approach last seen under Leo Varadkar’s predecessor, Enda Kenny. A new spirit of cooperation can infuse Anglo-Irish relations once again, but responsibility for its deterioration cannot be laid at the door of London alone. There is still much room for common ground. Mutually acceptable border arrangements can be devised in the context of the free-trade agreement that Ireland badly needs.

Key Recommendations

1) The negotiations should aim to achieve three things – all of which can be delivered:

a. Respect the UK’s referendum result, including its departure from the Single Market and Customs Union

b. Preserve a frictionless border between Northern Ireland and the Republic

c. Maintain the free flow of trade between the UK, EU, including Northern Ireland and the Republic

2) These outcomes can be achieved through a UK/EU free trade agreement and technical solutions to border crossings – the so-called Max-Fac option.

3) These solutions are being shunned by Brussels and Dublin for political reasons. The UK should persist in advancing the sensible ‘max-fac’ solution.

4) The UK Government should now return to its earlier position of insisting that full settlement of the Irish border issue should await the wider agreement on trade arrangements.

5) Ultimately, the Republic of Ireland stands to lose most from a failure to reach an agreement, followed by the EU. The Irish Government should co-operate with the UK in devising a border without physical infrastructure.

6) Peace in Northern Ireland, including the Good Friday Agreement, is more secure now than it was 30 years ago when the treaty was published. Those seeking to undermine Britain’s withdrawal from the EU by scaremongering over the future of the GFA are wrong and should desist.

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