VoxEU: Macroprudential supervision in the Eurozone - Beware of excessive expectations

03 June 2015

This column argues that, while based on the right principles, the EU framework grants supervisors a high degree of discretion that entails the risk of limited commitment and excessive fine-tuning.

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 strongly altered the view of regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Microprudential regulation and supervision – directed at the individual institution – had not prevented the crisis, but had contributed to it or at least made it worse (Hellwig 2009). Therefore, there is now a broad consensus that supervision ought to include a macroprudential perspective that focuses on the stability of the entire financial system rather than on individual institutions.

To this end, in the EU, a large number of new institutions and regulatory instruments have been created. This has resulted in a complex web of macroprudential supervisory structures and a large new toolkit, which has raised great expectations regarding the effectiveness of the new approach. This column presents and critically evaluates the newly created macroprudential framework in the Eurozone, with a particular focus on Germany. We make the following major suggestions:

 

Full article on VoxEU


© VoxEU.org