Graham Bishop: Temporary Eurobill Fund (TEF) – Summary of the Proposal and some Implications

03 July 2013

Over the past two years, Graham has been working on developing a plan for a Temporary Eurobill Fund. He is now looking forward to taking his place on the Commission's Expert Group (on the joint issuance of debt in the form of a redemption fund and eurobills) to help move the debate along.

In a press release on 2nd July 2013, President Barroso, in agreement with Vice-President Rehn, set up the European Commission's Expert Group looking into the merits and risks, legal requirements and financial consequences of initiatives for the joint issuance of debt in the form of a redemption fund and eurobills. He selected Graham Bishop to be a member of the group. This reflected his work over the past two years in developing a plan for a Temporary Eurobill Fund (TEF)[1].


The Temporary Eurobill Fund is a time-limited plan carefully structured to avoid opening its members to the virtually unlimited liability of guaranteeing all the debts of other members – as would happen in a mutualised pool of debt with 'joint & several' guarantees. The guarantees would be 'pro rata' – as with the existing ECB/ESM structure.  It is not a magic solution to the crisis but is a relatively modest and experimental step towards building trust and support amongst euro area states.

The TEF is entirely complementary to the ESM/OMTs but it is a reward for stability, rather than the ESM’s penalty for instability. Only euro area states not in a Programme or subject to sanctions for failure to comply with Eurogroup economic policy recommendations would be eligible borrowers from the TEF. It does not require a change to the European Treaties and could operate within a year.

There must be ex ante controls – especially on debt issuance by participants - so that all members understand their potential liability. The controls would limit any shortening of debt maturity. The Fund’s exposure to a State would be capped at [20-30%] of the State’s 'gross government debt’ – giving a theoretical maximum size of around €2.5 trillion if all eligible states took full advantage of the permitted re-financing possibilities but its likely size would be perhaps €1.6 trillion. Participants’ overall risk exposure should normally be no greater than at present.

Participating states MUST refinance ALL existing debt of less than two years maturity as it falls due. The TEF would issue a mixture of maturities to match exactly the borrowing needs of the participants but the maximum maturity would be two years. The short-term nature of the debt would maintain a powerful discipline on participating states as any sustained breach of conditionality would eventually lead to exclusion from the Fund. Strong market discipline would still apply to all securities longer than two years. The exposure of other states would last two years, at  most. The Fund would wind up after [five] years – coinciding with the scheduled review of the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Growth (often called the Fiscal Compact).

Other advantages of such a plan include:

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[1] See detailed TEF paper - link


© Graham Bishop