IMF: From bail-out to bail-in - mandatory debt restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions

24 April 2012

This IMF paper presents the argument that bail-in power needs to be considered as an additional and complementary tool for the resolution of SIFIs.

Bail-in is a statutory power of a resolution authority, as opposed to contractual arrangements, such as contingent capital requirements. It involves recapitalisation through relatively straightforward mandatory debt restructuring, and could therefore avoid some of the operational and legal complexities that arise when using other tools (such as P&A transactions), which require transferring assets and liabilities between different legal entities and across borders. By restoring the viability of a distressed SIFI, the pressure on the institution to post more collateral, for example against their repo contracts, could be significantly reduced, thereby minimising liquidity risks and preventing runs by short-term creditors.

The design and implementation of a bail-in power, however, need to take into careful consideration its potential market impact and its implications for financial stability. It is  especially important that the triggering of a bail-in power is not perceived by the market as a sign of the concerned institution’s non-viability, a perception that could trigger a run by short-term creditors and aggravate the institution’s liquidity problem. An effective bail-in framework generally includes the following key design elements:

• The scope of the statutory power should be limited to (i) eliminating or diluting existing shareholders; and (ii) writing down or converting, in the following order, any contractual contingent capital instruments, subordinated debt, and unsecured senior debt, accompanied by the power of the resolution authority to change bank management.
• The triggers for bail-in power should be consistent with those used for other resolution tools and set at the point when an institution would have breached the regulatory minima but  before it became balance-sheet insolvent, to allow for a prompt response to an SIFI’s financial distress. The intervention criteria (a combination of quantitative and qualitative assessments) need to be as transparent and predictable as possible to avoid market uncertainty.
• It may be necessary to require banks or bank holding companies to maintain a minimum  amount of unsecured liabilities (as a percentage of total liabilities) beforehand, which could be subject to bail-in afterwards. This would help reassure the market that bail-in is sufficient to recapitalise the distressed institution and restore its viability, thus reduce the risk of runs by short-term creditors.
• To fund potential liquidity outflows, and given the probable temporary loss of market access, bail-in may need to be coupled with adequate official liquidity assistance.
• Bail-in needs to be considered as one element of a comprehensive framework that includes effective supervision to reduce the likelihood of bank failures and an effective overall resolution framework that allows for an orderly resolution of a failed SIFI, facilitated by up-to-date recovery and resolution plans. In general, statutory bail-in should be used in instances where a capital infusion is likely to restore a distressed financial institution to viability, possibly because, other than a lack of capital, the institution is viable and has a decent business model and good risk management systems. Otherwise, bail-in capital could simply delay the inevitable failure.

Full paper

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