In 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker started his term in office qualifying his Commission as being the “last chance”. Five years later the new Commission might be defined as that of “new opportunity” for the revival of the community project with ideas and ambition for the future.
B. A PROGRAMME FOR GLOBAL ACTION
The Commission’s programme focuses on six main priorities: the green new deal, a Europe fit for the digital age, an economy that works for people, new impetus for European democracy, promoting the European way of life and a strong Europe in the world. It is both the political continuation of the impetus already given by the European Council and the Commission, as well as an expression of the balance of power created by the political groups in Parliament.
1. Climate and Digital Transitions
Two issues underpin a part of the Commission’s programme in both its internal and external dimensions, with repercussions on economic, industrial and social policies: the green new deal and digital transition, which will be “a source of change for all”.
Regarding the climate and the environment, the goal is to make Europe the “the first climatically neutral continent” by 2050. The president has made it a central point of her mandate. Her first initiative is planned before the European Council on 12th and 13th December, which is to discuss the Union’s climate goals, and during the UN Conference on the Climate (COP25) that will be taking place in Madrid until 13th December, which she plans to be a narrative framework for future work over the next five years. The measure introduced highlights the scope of the climate policy in the Commission’s work, with its economic stakes and the importance of its political guidance, at a time when this is turning into a societal and electoral stake.
The green deal was given to Frans Timmermans, who will be coordinating the work of five Commissioners: transport, energy, healthcare, environment and agriculture. The scope of climate reform will include the transition over to renewable energies, the extension of the emissions trading system (ETS) to the maritime and aviation sectors, industrial decarbonisation, a new action plan for the circular economy, as well as the alignment of the common agricultural policy on climate and environmental goals.
The financial aspect of climate change will be supervised by Valdis Dombrovskis. He will be responsible for the introduction of an investment plan for a sustainable Europe (which should enable the leverage of 1000 billion € over the next decade), the development of green finance and the reorientation of the European Investment Bank towards “green” projects.
The operational strategy has been given to two executive Vice Presidents in an extremely political division of roles, which highlights the responsibility of the Fair Transition Fund attributed to Elisa Ferreira. This division of roles will require good coordination, but in theory it enables trans-partisan action on the part of the college and as wide a support as possible in Parliament.
The management of the digital policy follows the same schema with an Executive Vice-President, Margrethe Vestager, who is responsible for the coordination of two Commissioners in the single market and innovation and youth. These two portfolios cover extensive areas, from industrial policy to research and development, from artificial intelligence to creative industries, from the development of the digital single market to that of the defence industry and space.
Margrethe Vestager is the new person responsible for competition, a sign of the Commission’s determination to integrate economic upheaval in the field of one its traditional competences. She is also responsible for drawing up a strategy for the future of European industry with Valdis Dombrovskis.
2. Geopolitics
More than in the past the geopolitical specificity of the Commission is to associate the internal and external aspects of its work. Hence, the promotion of a European way of life, which also coves the link between internal and external security and the introduction of a new DG Defence and the European Defence Fund as well as a strategy for space.
The external dimension underlies most of the Commission’s priorities. Beyond the goal of carbon neutrality, Europe aims to play a key role in global climate transition. Industrial strategy, especially digital, aims to ensure Europe’s competitiveness and also the control of its technologies, infrastructures, and standards so that it is not dependent on other powers.
The trade policy has been reoriented, and is less focused on the conclusion of new free-trade agreements and more on the maintenance of the multilateral system, the fight to counter unfair practices and the strengthening of trade defence tools – notably with the creation of the post of European Chief Trade Enforcement Officer. Similarly, Margrethe Vestager is responsible for adapting the European competition policy, in particular to counter market distortions caused by subsidies and capitalism on the part of foreign States, mainly China – and to be able to adopt a more global approach to the monitoring of the markets.
This new orientation goes together with stronger coordination on the part of the President who explains that “to ensure our external action becomes more strategic and coherent, it will be systematically discussed and decided on by the College”. A new coordination group, called Exco, bringing together members of the cabinets of all of the Commissioners, will assess the internal impact of possible external action and vice-versa .
Defence Minister for five and a half years, Ursula von der Leyen supports the development of European Defence, whilst being fully aware of the reticence, in her country and in the East of the Union, to do this outside of the framework of NATO. Continuing the work started in 2017 the Commission is promising to take “further bold steps” towards a “genuine” Defence of the European Union. The High Representative is responsible for this in coordination with Margrethe Vestager and Thierry Breton, who will set up the new DG Defence.
To achieve her ambitions, Ursula von der Leyen will have to develop a European defence industry, particularly by using the European defence fund, which is due to receive a budget of 13 billion €, to reduce the duplication of equipment between Member States and which is based on the principle of European preference in terms of purchasing. At the same time she will have to extend the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) using the EEAS and the Member States, to new missions, both civilian and military to protect the Union’s economic and strategic interests far from its borders and occupy areas – at sea, in the air and in the cyber world – without the control of which the Union will never able to guarantee its security. [...]
4. Long term projects
Beyond the priorities that mirror topical issues, the Commission will have to move forward in several areas on which the unity and coherence of the Union depend.
Migration is amongst these major subjects, since it is dividing Member States and societies deeply and that it entails Europe’s mastery of its borders and its neighbourhood. In line with the consensus of principle established by the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen hopes to blend solidarity with responsibility, as well as internal (asylum) and external (cooperation with the countries of origin and transit). Margaritis Schinas and Ylva Johansson are responsible for drafting a new migration policy with the goal of “strengthening our external borders to allow us to return to a fully functional Schengen,” whilst Jutta Urpilainen has been tasked with “investing in our partnerships with countries of origin to improve conditions and create opportunities.” No real path of how to settle political stalemates has been defined for the time being.
Ten years after the financial crisis the Commission has defined a goal to complete the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union, particularly via Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union. The room to manœuvre remains limited however because the Member States are struggling to agree on the measures to be used to reach these goals and the pace at which they should be implemented. To reduce economic and social imbalances between the States a DG Structural Reforms will be created. Elisa Ferreira is responsible for implementing the reform support programme and the future budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness – the draft of the euro zone budget requested by France – as well as the strategy for towns and urban regions (in which ¾ of the European population is concentrated) and the outermost regions.
5. The test of Brexit
The most likely work hypothesis in both Brussels and London is the UK’s exit of the Union on 31st January next. For the Commission the multisectoral negotiation regarding the future relation will be a test of its ability to project itself long term and to find a balance between the defence of the Union’s fundamental principles and the necessary pragmatism to protect Europe’s economic and strategic interests.
With Michel Barnier in charge of the Task Force for Relations with the UK, created at the end of October will start the new negotiation in line with the one undertaken regarding withdrawal. But whilst the strength of the law and the existential threat represented by Brexit fostered the unity of the States behind the negotiator in chief and the Commission, the multiplicity of the issues at stake for the Member States – from fisheries to financial services, military cooperation to trade links – will be more complicated. The free-trade agreement, the responsibility of which is to be held by Phil Hogan, will certainly be a field of experimentation, but also of assertion of the Union’s determination to set new social, data protection and especially, climate standards in international relations.
A critical point will be reached in July when the Union and the UK decide to extend, or not, the transition period planned to end on 31st December 2020. If the British government refuses to ask for an extension the Commission might find itself under great pressure to conclude an agreement on time despite the size and complexity of the goals to reach, whilst being forced as in 2018-2019 to update preparation for a no-deal.
C. INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES
1. Imbalance and Centralisation
Ursula von der Leyen again decided to organise the College in “project teams”, making this more explicit and more structured. In addition to the five Vice-Presidents there are three Executive VicePresidents the principle of which was set by the Council to satisfy the European political families. Their specific role has not been clarified however, except that it will introduce partisan bickering within the executive.
The distribution of competences between the Commissioners also seems unequal. Some of them have no authority over any DG, whilst Thierry Breton is leading three. The working group led by Vera Jourova on values and transparency only has two Commissioners, Didier Reynders and Helena Dalli. Two Vice-Presidents Maros Sefcovic and Dubravska Schinas are coordinating the work of four Commissioners in extremely different domains. These differences in treatment again raise the question of the number of Commissioners, the number of which is limited in the Lisbon Treaty to “two thirds of the number of Member States” but which the States have maintained at one per country[8]. It also raises the issue of the smooth functioning of collegial work if some Commissioners enjoy more political and administrative influence than others. In this regard cooperation between Frans Timmermans and Valdis Dombrovskis, each responsible for an important DG and a widened working group, as well as that between Thierry Breton and Margrethe Vestager will be decisive for the Commission’s success.
Whilst the global nature of some issues, like the climate, the digital economy and industry justify organisation in working groups and require horizontal work between Commissioners and between working groups, the organisation of the College might increase the role played by the Commissioners’ cabinets. In all events, it increases the power of the Commission’s Secretariat General, responsible for coordinating and supervising all of the departments and the centralisation in terms of the President’s cabinet.
2. A Restive Parliament
The process to approve the Commission showed that Ursula von der Leyen will not have the same relationship with Parliament as did Jean-Claude Juncker, who nurtured the “spirit of a parliamentary regime” with MEPs[9]. Some of them, including within the EPP, challenged her appointment, because she was not a “Spitzenkandidat”. Others consider her to be too far on the right or not ecologist enough.
The difficulty for the President will be to establish working relations with a fragmented Parliament that does not have a stable majority, but which is claiming a greater role in the legislative process. Since the European elections in May 2019 the grand EPP&SD coalition has not had a majority. Moreover, questions regarding economic, social and migration sometimes divide the groups themselves. To pacify her relations with Parliament she has promised MEPs the right to legislative initiative. This political promise goes beyond the treaty, which reserves the Commission the exclusive, but conditional, right of initiative. The adoption of a resolution will be necessary by a majority of MEPs, and not just the electorate, for the Commission to put forward a text, which itself should “fully respect the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and “better regulation”. Some, particularly the President of the EPP group, Manfred Weber, would like to go further by committing the executive as soon as a resolution has been approved by a simple majority, but also by having the Parliament establish the Commission’s legislative programme.
One other criteria on which good institutional relations between the Commission and Parliament will depend, is the way the selection procedure of the President of the Commission will be reformed. Ursula von der Leyen has promised to improve the Spitzenkandidat system, to make it more visible, whilst defending the principle of trans-national lists which the Parliament rejected in 2018. The reform of the European elections and the appointment of the head of the executive will be discussed during the Conference on the Future of Europe and will therefore depend in part on an agreement between the Member States.
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