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Brexit and the City
18 October 2011

マーティン・ウォルフ:ユーロの将来は明るくない


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In his FT column, Wolf says that it is conceivable – if unlikely – that the eurozone will find ways to manage its emergency. It is inconceivable that it will cure the illness, partly because members are in denial about its nature and partly because it is a chronic condition. The fundamental challenge is not financing, but adjustment.


Fix banks; fix Greece; and fix debt markets of other fragile eurozone sovereigns. These are the elements of the desired package. The main policy approach is also clear: pour buckets of money over everything.

Suppose the immediate crisis were indeed overcome, in such ways. Would this promise a sunlit future for the euro? No. Nor, as so many suggest, is some sort of fiscal union the answer. True, if creditworthy members were to transfer resources to the uncreditworthy on a large enough scale, the eurozone might be kept together. But, even if such a policy could be sustained (which is unlikely), it would turn southern Europe into a greater Mezzogiorno. That would be a calamitous outcome of European monetary integration.

The fundamental challenge is not financing, but adjustment. Eurozone policymakers have long insisted that the balance of payments cannot matter inside a currency union. Indeed, it is a quasi-religious belief that only fiscal deficits matter: all other balances within the economy will equilibrate automatically. This is nonsense. By far the best predictor of subsequent difficulties were the pre-crisis external deficits, not the fiscal deficits.

Why do external deficits matter?

First, external deficits mean that residents are spending more than their income and financing the difference abroad. If creditors decide such borrowers are no longer creditworthy (be they private or public), they will cut them off, thereby causing a recession and a plunge into – or deepening of – fiscal deficits. Second, prolonged external deficits also shape the structure and competitiveness of an economy.

Third, sustained deficits lead to huge net external liabilities, often intermediated by banks. When the external lending halts, the banks are likely to implode, undermining both the economy and the fiscal position. As Goldman Sachs notes, the inability to devalue also rules out a way of adjusting net liability positions that has proved helpful to the US and UK. Worse, the only available mechanism – an “internal devaluation” (or falling domestic price level) – will make the burden of external debt even greater. The improvement in the current account balance must then be even bigger than it would otherwise need to be.

Most important of all, people care about what happens to their own country. The inhabitants of a depressed member country will hardly console themselves with the thought that others are booming.

Inside the eurozone, adjustment of imbalances remains essential. But it is also vastly difficult, because the exchange rate has gone. In its place, comes adjustment via depression and default. A currency union with structural mercantilists in the core now threatens a permanent slump in the periphery. Solving that is the true cure. Can it be done? I wonder.

Full article (FT subscription required)



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