|
In order to get a grip on financial systems and to restore market stability, regulators strived for the establishment of safety nets. Today, these nets basically consist of four individual parts or stabilisers:
From the ESBG and WSBI point of view - with regard to the functioning of deposit insurance within the safety net - two central aspects, which were drastically revealed during the financial crisis, seem worth being explicated:
First, there is significant interdependence between the individual parts of the system, which entails that the weakest of the individual safety elements in the system as a whole always determines the degree of existing financial market stability.
Second, financial system safety nets and each of their individual components are characterised by their double-edged nature in so far as - contrary to their intended function - they can have equally significant destabilising effects on financial markets if they undermine market discipline and create moral hazard problems.
The investors and bank management ultimately rely on the DIS (and thus primarily in others) to cover the costs resulting from their risky behaviour, while they reap the profits, which is thus a perfect example of moral hazard.
Therefore, the ´benefits´ of a DIS (investor protection and prevention of bank runs) should always be weighted against its ´costs´ (weakened market discipline and greater responsibility).
The tendency to greater investor protection and thus less market discipline will be somewhat mitigated by the risk-based contributions that are provided for by the Directive. These contribution payments, however, concern only the incentive structure of the bank management and do not find any equivalence on the investor level.
In the ESBG and WSBI view, this should be considered as a ´potential gap in the design of DIS’.
Proposals